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Events	  such	  as	  September	  11,	  2001,	  and	  the	  revelation	  that	  the	  Khan	  Nuclear	  Network	  
helped	   known	   proliferators	   obtain	   needed	   equipment	   prompted	   international	   focus	   on	   illicit	  
procurement	  networks.	  This	  study	  focuses	  on	  those	  efforts,	  considers	  their	  effectiveness,	  and	  
asks	  what	  more	  can	  be	  done.	  	  
METHODOLOGY	  
The	  study	  was	  commissioned	  by	  the	  Defense	  Threat	  Reduction	  Agency.	  	  It	  is	  the	  fourth	  
in	   a	   succession	   of	   investigations,	   conducted	   by	   James	   Russell	   and	   Jack	   Boureston	   into	   the	  
workings	   of	   illicit	   procurement	   networks	   and	   the	   efforts	   that	   the	   international	   community	   is	  
taking	  to	  stop	  these	  networks.	  	  
Russell	  and	  Boureston	  set	  out	  to	  answer	  the	  following	  questions:	  Are	  there	  any	  practices	  
that	  procurement	  agents	  use	  to	  elude	  law	  enforcement	  authorities?	  Why	  does	  the	  illicit	  trade	  
of	   sensitive	   technologies	   continue?	   Why	   haven’t	   individual	   nations	   and	   the	   international	  
community	   been	   able	   to	   stop	   illicit	   traffickers?	   What	   more	   can	   be	   done	   to	   stop	   illicit	  
procurement	  networks?	  	  
To	   answer	   these	   questions,	   the	   investigators	   reviewed	   secondary	   sources	   since	   2009	  
(the	   end	   of	   their	   third	   investigation	   of	   networks)	   and	   contacted	   a	   number	   of	   international	  
experts	  who	  have	   focused	  on	   illicit	   trade	   issues	   to	   get	   their	   perspective	  on	   the	  problem	  and	  
possible	  solutions.	  
KNOWN	  FACTS	  ABOUT	  ILLICIT	  PROCUREMENT	  
Since	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   industrial	   revolution,	   states	   have	   looked	   externally	   to	  
supplement	   their	   knowledge	   of	   new	   technologies	   and	   to	   obtain	   needed	   materials.	   In	   cases	  
where	   nations	   have	   built	   weapons	   of	   mass	   destruction	   (WMD)	   –	   chemical,	   biological,	  
radiological	  and	  nuclear	  (CBRN)	  weapons	  –	  their	  success	  was	  based	  on	  the	  acquisition	  of	  vital	  
equipment,	  materials,	  and	  know-­‐how	  from	  foreign	  entities.	  History	  has	  recorded	  time	  and	  time	  
again	   examples	   of	   nations	   sending	   agents	   to	   far	   off	   lands	   to	   acquire	   designs	   and	   recruit	  
technicians	  in	  support	  of	  indigenous	  efforts	  to	  develop	  WMD	  systems.1	  
Despite	   new	   international	   efforts	   to	   stop	   the	   spread	   of	   sensitive	   technologies,	   illicit	  
procurement	   activities	   continue. 2 	  In	   January	   2012,	   the	   U.S.	   Department	   of	   Justice	   (DOJ)	  
reported	  on	  more	  than	  250	  cases	  over	  a	  5-­‐year	  period	  of	  nationals	  from	  China,	  Colombia,	  Iran,	  
Nigeria,	  Pakistan,	  Syria,	  Venezuela,	  and	  other	  countries	  conspiring	  to	  procure	  various	  high	  tech	  
items	   that	   could	   be	   used	   to	   further	   their	   country’s	  military	   programs.3	  The	  DOJ	   only	   records	  
4 
 
U.S.	  cases,	  but	  similar	  numbers	  might	  be	  found	  in	  other	  industrialized	  countries	  such	  as	  Japan,	  
the	   United	   Kingdom,	   France,	   Germany,	   and	   Canada.4	  And	   these	   are	   only	   the	   known	   cases.	  
There	  must	  be	  a	  number	  of	  cases	  that	  are	  unknown	  and	  successful.	  States	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  
continue	  to	  inch	  closer	  to	  developing	  weapons	  that	  one	  day	  will	  threaten	  peace	  and	  stability	  in	  
the	  world.	  
Network	  Structures	  
What	   do	   networks	   look	   like?	   In	   his	   2005	   International	   Security	   article,	   “Ringing	   in	  
Proliferation,”	   Alexander	   Montgomery	   describes	   three	   basic	   illicit	   procurement	   network	  
structures:	   Rings	   or	   Circles;	   Stars;	   and	   Cliques.	   According	   to	  Montgomery,	  Rings	   are	   created	  
with	  connections	  between	  nodes	   to	   form	  a	  circle;	  Stars	  are	   fashioned	  with	  nodes	  connecting	  
through	   a	   central	   hub;	   and	   in	  Cliques	   nodes	   are	   connected	   to	   each	   other	   directly	   to	   form	   a	  
network.5	  Most	  nuclear	  procurement	  networks	  appear	  to	  be	  Star	  structured,	  with	  a	  central	  hub	  
providing	  direction	  and	  nodes	  operating	  semi-­‐autonomously.	  However,	  North	  Korea	  and	  other	  
countries	   may	   have	   created	   Clique	   structured	   networks	   with	   nodes	   that	   help	   other	   nodes	  
acquire	  needed	  technologies	  and	  share	   it	  among	  them	  all.	  Through	  his	  analysis,	  Montgomery	  
was	  able	  to	  map	  interactions	  between	  North	  Korea,	  Iran,	  Pakistan,	  and	  possibly	  others.6	  
Figure	  1.	  Network	  Structures	  
Simple	  Network	  Structures	   Missile	  Network	  Structure	  
	  
	  
Source:	  Montgomery,	  “Ringing	  in	  Proliferation,”	  International	  Security,	  Fall	  2005.	  	  
	  
Changing	  Structures?	  
In	  her	  paper	  “The	  New	  Face	  of	  Illicit	  Trafficking	  Networks,”	  Ashley	  Nilsen	  asserted	  that,	  
networks	   no	   longer	   follow	   a	   traditional,	   hierarchical	   model	   of	   operations,	   but	   instead	   have	  
transformed	  into	  a	  “network	  of	  networks,”	  that	  is	  loosely	  connected	  with	  a	  common	  purpose,	  
but	  operates	   independently	  with	  no	   responsibility	   to	   a	   central	   organization.7	  This	  may	  define	  
the	  Khan	  network	  better	  than	  any	  other	  depiction.	  Although	  it	  began	  as	  a	  network	  to	  support	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Pakistan’s	   nuclear	   program,	   it	   became	   a	   loosely	   formed	   conglomerate	   that	   operated	  
independently	  to	  support	  the	  demand	  of	  Khan’s	  clients;	  Iran,	  Libya	  and	  North	  Korea.	  	  
	  
Case	  Studies	  
This	  section	  describes	  examples	  of	  state	   illicit	  procurement	  activities	  to	  acquire	  WMD-­‐
related	  technologies.	  
Pakistan	  
In	   1974,	   in	   response	   to	   India’s	   peaceful	   nuclear	   explosion	   (PNE),	   the	   Pakistani	  
government	   organized	   a	   clandestine	   group	   under	   the	   Pakistan	   Atomic	   Energy	   Commission	  
(PAEC)	   to	   build	   a	   nuclear	   weapon.	   Recognizing	   that	   it	   lacked	   various	   equipment	   and	  
technologies,	   the	   PAEC	   established	   a	  multi-­‐layered	   procurement	   group	   to	   seek	   technologies	  
around	   the	   world,	   while	   evading	   international	   detection	   and	   controls.	   This	   group	   enlisted	  
nationals	   that	   were	   living	   abroad	   to	   approach	   local	   suppliers;	   made	   purchases	   and	   shipping	  
materials	   to	   Pakistan;	   acquired	   piece	   parts	   rather	   than	  whole	   assemblies;	  mislabeled	   critical	  
components	   on	   long	   lists	   of	   useless	  materials;	   paid	   exaggerated	  prices	   to	   entice	   suppliers	   to	  
overlook	   export	   license	   requirements;	   requested	   samples	   that	   could	   be	   re-­‐engineered;	  
purchased	  raw	  materials	  and	  the	  machines	  	  needed	  to	  manufacture	  components	  and	  produce	  
complete	  assemblies;	  established	  transshipment	  routes;	  and	  cooperated	  with	  friendly	  countries	  
such	  as	  China,	  Libya,	  and	  North	  Korea	  to	  obtain	  needed	  materials.8	  During	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s,	  
Pakistan’s	  purchasing	  agents	  visited	  companies	  and	  met	  with	  representatives	  to	  attain	  needed	  
goods,	   services,	   and	   knowledge.	   The	   agents	   courted	   organizations	   that	  were	   sympathetic	   to	  
Pakistan’s	  quest	  to	  gain	  parity	  with	  India	  or	  were	  just	  willing	  to	  sell	  goods	  at	  a	  marked-­‐up	  price.	  	  
In	  what	   is	   now	   the	  most	   publicized	   case	   on	   nuclear	   networks,	   A.Q.	   Khan,	   a	   Pakistani	  
national	   who	   worked	   in	   the	   Netherlands	   in	   the	   early	   1970s,	   helped	   his	   country	   establish	   a	  
procurement	   network.	  Not	   only	  was	   Khan	   instrumental	   in	   supporting	   Pakistan’s	   program,	   he	  
also	  assisted	  programs	  in	  Iran,	  Libya,	  and	  North	  Korea.	  According	  to	  Mark	  Hibbs	  at	  the	  Carnegie	  
Endowment	  for	  International	  Peace,	  “It	   is	   important	  to	  underscore	  that,	  unlike	  cases	  in	  which	  
national	   governments	   tightly	  managed	   clandestine	  procurement	   activities	   to	   develop	  nuclear	  
weapons,	   the	   activities	   of	   the	   Khan	   network	   were	   apparently	   not	   steered	   by	   a	   national	  
government	   but	   were	   carried	   out	   in	   parallel	   with	   Pakistan’s	   nuclear	   weapons	   program	   and	  
involved	   scores	   of	   non-­‐state	   actors	   –	   engineers,	  manufacturing	   companies,	   traders,	   brokers,	  




Khan’s	   procurement	   network	   used	   intermediaries	   in	   Austria,	   Dubai,	   Germany,	   Japan,	  
Malaysia,	   the	  Netherlands,	  Singapore,	  South	  Africa,	  Switzerland,	  Turkey,	   the	  U.S,	   the	  UK,	  and	  
other	   countries.	   The	   network	   was	  made	   up	   of	   Khan’s	   former	   school	   mates,	   colleagues,	   and	  
contacts.	   Its	   loose	   connections	   underscore	   the	   importance	   of	   social	   networks	   as	   a	   basis	   for	  
developing	  and	  operating	  any	  business.	  Khan	  used	  his	  network	  to	  seek	  out	  and	  acquire	  needed	  
items.	  He	  established	  transshipping	  points	  in	  Turkey	  and	  Dubai	  while	  manufacturing	  operations	  
were	   located	   in	  South	  Africa	  and	  Malaysia.	  Khan	  also	  trained	  his	  clients	  to	  use	  the	  machining	  
tools	   that	   he	   purchased	   for	   them,	   so	   they	   could	   manufacture	   needed	   equipment	   for	   their	  
programs.10	  
	  
Although	   it	   was	   a	   vast	   and	   loosely	   linked	   network,	   Khan	   maintained	   some	   form	   of	  
control	   over	   its	   activities.	   According	   to	   Bruno	   Gruselle,	   a	   prominent	   French	   expert	   on	   illicit	  
procurement	   networks,	   “The	   A.Q.	   Khan	   Company	   appears	   to	   have	   always	   operated	   on	   the	  
principle	   of	   a	   direct	   initial	   contact	   between	   the	   network	   leader	   and	   his	   customers.	   Once	  
contacts	  had	  been	  made	  and	  main	  principles	  had	  been	  defined,	  Khan	  appears	  to	  have	  left	  his	  
main	   associates	   responsible	   for	   operational	   implementation.”11	  Although	   initially	   working	   for	  
his	  country	  only,	  Khan	  at	  some	  point	  must	  have	  realized	  that	  he	  could	  profit	  from	  the	  interest	  
of	   other	   countries’	   intent	   on	   developing	   an	   indigenous	   nuclear	   program.	   By	   this	   time,	   Khan	  
operated	   totally	   outside	   of	   his	   government’s	   controls.	   He	   extended	   his	   network	   to	   not	   only	  
include	   Pakistani	   nationals	   living	   overseas,	   but	   also	   foreign	   friends	   and	   colleague.	   Khan	   also	  
encouraged	   his	   associates	   to	   enlist	   family	   members	   and	   friends	   to	   assist	   in	   the	   network’s	  
operations.	  
	  
There	  is	  evidence	  that	  Pakistan	  continues	  to	  operate	  a	  network	  of	  buyers	  that	  includes	  
nationals	   living	  around	   the	  world.	   The	  network	   continues	   to	   contact	   suppliers	   and	  purchases	  
sensitive	   materials	   for	   shipment	   back	   to	   Pakistan.	   A	   recent	   example	   is	   the	   case	   of	   Nadeem	  
Akhtar,	  a	  Pakistan	  citizen,	  who	  between	  2005	  and	  2010	  worked	  with	  Pakistani	  associates	  living	  
in	   the	   U.S.	   to	   acquire	   equipment	   such	   as	   valves,	   switching	   equipment,	   coolant	   water	  
purification	   devices,	   and	   calibration	   equipment.	   The	   group	   evaded	   export	   restrictions	   by	  
undervaluing	   and	   falsely	   describing	   items	   being	   exported;	   hiding	   the	   true	   end-­‐user	   of	   the	  
equipment	  by	  using	  third	  parties	  and/or	  faking	  business	  entities	  in	  locations	  such	  as	  Dubai	  and	  
the	  United	   States;	   using	  other	   individuals	   in	   Illinois	   and	  California	   to	   procure	   items	   for	   them	  
under	   false	   pretenses;	   shipping	   items	   to	   his	   residences	   in	   Maryland	   so	   it	   would	   appear	   as	  
though	  Akhtar’s	   company	  was	   the	   end-­‐user;	   and	   transshipping	   the	   equipment	   from	   the	  U.S.	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through	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  (UAE).	  Akhtar	  took	  his	  direction	  from	  a	  trading	  company	  in	  
Pakistan	  that	  was	  filling	  orders	  from	  the	  Pakistani	  government.12	  
Iraq	  
In	  the	  early	  1980s,	  Iraq	  created	  a	  sophisticated	  procurement	  network	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  	  
Pakistan’s	   to	   help	   it	   obtain	   equipment	   for	   its	  WMD	   programs.	   The	  Ministry	   of	   Industry	   and	  
Military	   Industrialization	   (MIMI)	   coordinated	   Iraq’s	   commercial,	   diplomatic	   and	   intelligence	  
entities,	  and	  established	   front	  companies	   to	  make	   inquiries	   for	  procuring	   items.	   Iraq’s	  agents	  
also	  mimicked	  many	  of	  the	  techniques	  developed	  by	  Pakistan	  to	  evade	  the	  export	  controls	  of	  
other	  nations.	  
Iraq	  used	  its	  embassy	  personnel	  to	  help	  it	   identify	  willing	  sellers	  of	  equipment	  needed	  
for	  its	  program.	  In	  one	  case,	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  Ali	  Abdul	  Muttalib,	  commercial	  attaché	  at	  the	  
Iraqi	  embassy	  in	  Bonn,	  Germany	  identified	  companies	  that	  could	  fill	  item	  requests,	  and	  learned	  
how	  to	  elude	  European	  export	  controls	  by	  describing	  equipment	  in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  hide	  their	  
true	  utility.13	  Muttalib	  set-­‐up	  buying	  missions	  for	  Iraqi	  delegations	  and	  put	  them	  in	  touch	  with	  
local	  company	  representatives.	   In	  1987,	  he	  organized	  a	  visit	  of	   Iraqis	  to	  Germany	  to	  purchase	  
goods	   such	   as	   HEU	   processing	   equipment	   and	   high	   speed	   measuring	   devices	   to	   help	   Iraq	  
develop	  high	  explosive	  lenses	  for	  nuclear	  weapons.	  Muttalib	  introduced	  his	  Iraqi	  colleagues	  to	  
Werner	  Sonntag,	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  engineering	  firm	  Neuero	  and	  import/export	  company	  
Inwako.	  The	   Iraqis	  gave	  Sonntag	  a	   long	   list	  of	  explosive	   test	  equipment	  and	   the	   technologies	  
that	  they	  needed	  and	  Sonntag	  found	  it	  for	  them.	  He	  also	  found	  and	  provided	  other	  equipment	  
such	   as	   ring	   magnets	   to	   stabilize	   centrifuges,	   and	   rotor	   stand	   equipment	   to	   stabilize	   Iraq’s	  
missile	  systems.14	  	  
Iraq	   frequently	   used	   outside	   experts	   in	   countries	   such	   as	   Germany	   to	   obtain	   needed	  
materials	   for	   their	   nuclear	   program.	   In	   the	   mid-­‐1980s,	   Bruno	   Stemmler,	   a	   former	   MAN	  
Technology	  employee	  who	  had	  dealings	  with	   the	   Iraqis,	   introduced	  Karl	  Heinz	   Schaab,	   also	  a	  
former	  MAN	  Technology	  employee,	  to	  his	  Iraqi	  contacts	  for	  possible	  work.	  MAN	  was	  a	  principal	  
at	   a	   company	  who	   contracted	   to	   the	   URENCO	   uranium	   enrichment	   consortium	   for	   services.	  
Schaab	   helped	   Iraq	   acquire	   URENCO	   centrifuge	   rotors	   and	   the	   machine	   tools	   necessary	   to	  
manufacture	  them.	   Iraqi	  agents	  often	  found	  companies	  such	  as	  Schaab’s	  that	  were	  small	  and	  
needed	   infusions	  of	  capital.15	  Schaab	  and	  his	  colleagues	  made	  at	   least	   two	  shipments	  to	   Iraq.	  
The	   first	   was	   a	   box	   of	   rotor	   samples,	   sent	   in	   1989.	   The	   next	   year,	   Schaab	  manufactured	   20	  
complete	  rotors	  and	  shipped	  them	  to	  his	  Iraqi	  buyers	  via	  an	  Austrian	  transshipper.16	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As	  a	  part	  of	  its	  network,	  MIMI	  established	  a	  series	  of	  front	  companies	  to	  procure	  items.	  	  
MIMI	   used	   practices	   such	   as	   disguising	   shipment’s	   final	   destination	   and	  misrepresenting	   the	  
end-­‐use	   of	   material	   to	   elude	   controls.	   For	   example,	   in	   the	   1980s,	  MIMI	   set-­‐up	   the	   Al-­‐Arabi	  
Trading	   Company	   and	   Nassr	   General	   Establishment	   to	   procure	   materials	   for	   Iraq’s	  
unconventional	  weapons	  programs.	   Iraq	  used	  these	  companies	  to	  purchase	  controlling	  stocks	  
in	  other	  companies	  to	  obtain	  needed	  items.	  For	  instance,	  in	  1987,	  Al-­‐Arabi	  secretly	  purchased	  a	  
50	  percent	  stake	  of	  the	  German	  Firm	  H	  &	  H	  Metalform	  GmbH,	  which	  provided	  the	  Iraqis	  with	  
flow-­‐forming	  machines	  and	  specialty	  parts	  for	  missiles.	  
Some	  front	  companies	  installed	  subsidiaries	  in	  neighboring	  countries	  such	  as	  Jordan	  to	  
facilitate	   the	   procurement	   and	   shipment	   of	   goods	   into	   Iraq.	   In	   the	   early	   1990s,	   the	   Sattam	  
Hamid	   Farhan	   al-­‐Gaaod	   Company	   established	   the	   Al-­‐Eman	   Commercial	   Investment	   Group	   to	  
organize	  material	  flows	  through	  Jordan	  to	  Iraq.	  The	  group	  regularly	  mislabeled	  the	  contents	  of	  
packages	  and	  disguised	  end-­‐users	  to	  quell	  suspicions	  of	  illegal	  activities.	  Within	  the	  Iraq	  Survey	  
Group’s	  final	  report,	  the	  Al-­‐Eman	  Commercial	  Investment	  Group	  was	  noted	  as	  a	  large	  group	  of	  
front	  companies	  with	  subsidiaries	  operating	  in	  Baghdad,	  Dubai,	  and	  Amman.17	  Throughout	  the	  
1990s,	   Al-­‐Eman	   shipped	   at	   least	   one	   container	   a	  month	   through	   Jordan	   to	   Iraq	   via	   the	   Iraqi	  
Embassy	  in	  Jordan.18	  	  
North	  Korea	  
In	   the	   course	   of	   its	   development	   of	   weapons	   of	   mass	   destruction,	   North	   Korea	   has	  
emulated	   the	   illicit	  procurement	  practices	  of	  Pakistan,	   Iraq,	   and	   Iran.	  These	  practices	   include	  
using	   nationals	   living	   abroad	   to	   help	   identify,	   acquire,	   and	   ship	   needed	   equipment	   home,	  
operating	   front	  companies	   to	  purchase	  and	  ship	  material,	  and	  using	  third	  party	  suppliers	  and	  
intermediaries	  to	  acquire	  materials	  and	  know-­‐how.	  	  
In	  1946,	  North	  Korean	  nationals	  living	  in	  Japan	  created	  the	  Association	  of	  the	  Scientists	  
of	   North	   Korean	   Residents	   in	   Japan.	   Shortly	   thereafter,	   the	   Association	   created	   the	   Korean	  
Association	   of	   Science	   and	   Technology	   (KAST),	  which	   has	   been	   an	   effective	   conduit	   for	   illicit	  
procurement	  of	  material	  and	  access	  to	  know-­‐how	  from	  Japan	  into	  North	  Korea.	  KAST	  is	  under	  
the	   direct	   control	   of	   the	   external	   relations	   division	   of	   the	   Korean	   Workers	   Party	   (KWP)	   in	  
Pyongyang.	  It	  is	  comprised	  of	  approximately	  1,200	  members,	  some	  of	  which	  work	  in	  fields	  such	  
as	  physics	  and	  engineering.19	  The	  group	  operates	  12	  branches	  all	  over	  Japan.	  Its	  members	  work	  
in	   research	   institutes,	   national	   universities,	   and	   technology	   companies.	   Some	   of	   these	  
organizations	  have	  been	  implicated	  in	  the	  transfer	  of	  materials	  to	  North	  Korea.20	  In	  1993,	  Daiei	  
–	   a	   KAST	   affiliated	   company	   –	   arranged	   for	   the	   export	   of	  measurement	   equipment	   to	  North	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Korea.	   In	   1994,	   Japanese	   authorities	   discovered	   that	   another	   KAST	   related	   company	   had	  
transferred	  a	  jet	  mill	  machine	  –	  equipment	  used	  to	  grind	  materials	  finely	  –	  to	  North	  Korea.21	  	  
Since	  the	  1950s,	  North	  Korea	  has	  looked	  to	  South	  Korea	  as	  a	  portal	  for	  obtaining	  needed	  
goods	   and	   knowledge	   that	   is	   required	   for	   its	   industrial	   development.	   For	   decades,	   the	   two	  
Koreas	  have	  held	   scientific	  and	  educational	  exchanges	   to	   foster	  better	   relationships	  between	  
the	   two	  countries.	  These	  exchanges	  have	  also	   facilitated	   transfers	  of	  goods	  and	  assistance	   to	  
the	  North.	   In	   one	   case	   in	   2004,	   four	   employees	  of	   Japan’s	  Horkos	  Corporation	   attempted	   to	  
send	   five-­‐axis	  machining	   tools	   to	   South	   Korea	   and	   ultimately	   to	  North	   Korea.	   In	   an	   effort	   to	  
evade	   Japan’s	   Ministry	   of	   Economy,	   Trade	   and	   Industry	   (METI)	   licensing	   requirements,	   the	  
employees	  mislabeled	   the	   items	   and	   declared	   on	   export	   declarations	   that	   the	   tools	   did	   not	  
require	   export	   licenses.	   Although	   these	   tools	   can	   be	   used	   to	   manufacture	   automotive	  
components	   and	   other	   commercial	   items,	   they	   are	   also	   used	   to	   produce	   uranium	   centrifuge	  
components.22	  Investigators	  believe	  that	   the	  employees	  sent	  more	  than	  1,000	  of	   the	   five-­‐axis	  
machine	  tools	  to	  16	  countries	  by	  falsifying	  export	  documents	  in	  this	  way.23	  
In	  the	  1970s,	  North	  Korea	  began	  deploying	  agents	  around	  the	  world	  to	  contact	  nationals	  
living	   abroad	   and	   acquiring	   items	   that	  were	   needed	   to	   support	   the	  North’s	  WMD	  programs.	  
North	  Korea’s	  procurement	  agents	  used	  A.Q.	  Khan’s	  list	  of	  nuclear	  suppliers	  to	  identify	  needed	  
equipment	   and	   acquire	   it.	   To	   help	   with	   these	   activities,	   the	   North	   created	   Office	   39	   in	   the	  
Portuguese	   colony	   of	   Macao.	   The	   Office	   became	   a	   key	   offshore	   center	   for	   North	   Korean	  
procurement.	   It	  ran	  a	  number	  of	  front	  companies	  such	  as	  the	  Zokwang	  Trading	  Company	  and	  
the	   Daesung	   Chongguk	   Company,	   which	   had	   offices	   in	   Austria	   to	   reach	   out	   to	   European	  
suppliers,	  purchase	  equipment,	  and	  ship	  it	  to	  North	  Korea.	  These	  companies	  used	  Macao’s	  lax	  
banking	  policies	  to	  pay	  for	  goods	  and	  move	  money	  back	  to	  their	  home	  country.24	  In	  2002,	  North	  
Korean	   experts	   attempted	   to	   procure	   22mt	   of	   6061-­‐T6-­‐grade	   aluminum	   pipes	   from	  Optonic	  
GmbH	  in	  Germany25	  and	  imported	  2600	  aluminum	  tubes	  from	  Russia.26	  In	  addition	  to	  targeting	  
European	   companies	   for	   materials,	   North	   Korean	   diplomats	   recruited	   South	   Korean	  
intellectuals	  living	  in	  Germany	  help	  purchase	  materials.27	  
The	  North	  operated	  (and	  may	  still	  operate)	  a	  logistic	  system	  between	  itself	  and	  Japan	  to	  
transport	   items	   home	   without	   raising	   suspicions.	   Specifically,	   the	   North	   Korean	   ferry	  Man	  
Gyong	  Bong	  that	  runs	  between	  the	  North	  and	  Japan	  was	  used	  to	  ship	  items	  home.	  According	  to	  
news	   reports,	   before	   the	   Taepo-­‐Dong-­‐1’s	   first	   test	   launch	   in	   1997,	  missile	   components	  were	  
regularly	   exported	   from	   Japan	   to	   North	   Korea.28	  In	   2003,	   the	   Tokyo	   Vacuum	   Corporation,	   a	  
vacuum	   pump	   maker,	   and	   an	   export	   agent	   Nakano	   Corp	   conspired	   to	   transport	   vacuum	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pump(s)	   useful	   for	   uranium	   enrichment	   to	   North	   Korea	   via	   a	   Taipei	   Taiwan	   company.29	  And	  
between	  August	  2006	  and	  August	  2007	  another	  Taipei	  company	  HuaYueh	  International,	  made	  
as	   many	   as	   14	   shipments	   of	   Japan	   origin	   dual-­‐use	   items	   (including	   stainless	   steel	   pipes,	  
computer	   software	   and	   computer	   numerical	   controlled	   machine	   tools)	   to	   North	   Korea.	   The	  
company	  reportedly	  labeled	  the	  point	  of	  destination	  as	  China.30	  
In	   2009,	   Japanese	   police	   arrested	   officials	   at	   the	   trading	   firm,	   Tokyo	   Boeki	   for	   the	  
attempted	  export	  of	  a	  magnetometer	  (a	  device	  used	  to	  measure	  magnetic	  fields	  and	  useful	  in	  
the	  development	  of	  missile	  guidance	  systems)	  to	  Myanmar.31	  The	  company	  was	  filling	  an	  order	  
made	  by	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  based	  front	  company	  New	  East	  International	  Company.32	  Tokyo	  Boeki	  
apparently	  exported	  a	  number	  of	  dual	  use	  items	  to	  Myanmar	  that	  eventually	  made	  their	  way	  to	  
North	  Korea.	  The	  items	  included	  a	  cylindrical	  grinder	  used	  to	  produce	  magnets	  used	  in	  missile	  
components	   and	   in	   uranium	   centrifuges.33	  In	   a	   Center	   for	   Nonproliferation	   Studies	   report,	  
Robert	   Shaw	   and	   his	   colleagues	   posited	   that	   “Myanmar	   has	   distinct	   advantages	   to	   North	  
Korean	  procurement	  networks	  that	  want	  to	  circumvent	  sanctions	  and	   illegally-­‐divert	  dual	  use	  
equipment	   to	   Pyongyang.	   Although	   it	   is	   subject	   to	   sanctions,	  Myanmar	   is	   not	   as	   isolated	   as	  
North	   Korea,	   and	   legitimate	   shipments	   originating	   from	   Japan,	   for	   example,	   provide	   suitable	  
cover	  for	  WMD-­‐related	  deliveries.”34	  
Iran	  
Since	  the	  1970s,	  Iran	  has	  acquired	  nuclear-­‐related	  material	  and	  equipment,	  designs,	  and	  
know-­‐how	   from	  countries	   such	  as	  China,	   France,	  Germany,	   Japan,	   the	  Netherlands,	   Pakistan,	  
Russia,	   Switzerland,	   and	   the	   United	   States.	   Iran’s	   system	   of	   procurement	   appears	   to	   be	  
modeled	   after	   Pakistan’s.	   Persons	   working	   in	   Iran’s	   embassies	   contacted	   companies	   and	  
individuals	   located	   in	   industrialized	   countries	   to	   acquire	   related	  material	   and	   ship	   it	   back	   to	  
Iran.	   Sometimes	   they	   established	   front	   organizations	   to	   falsify	   supplier	   nation’s	   end-­‐user	  
certification	  requirements.	  Iran’s	  use	  of	  universities	  as	  fronts	  is	  well	  documented.	  Of	  the	  many	  
universities	   that	   are	   a	  part	  of	   Iran’s	  procurement	  network,	   Sharif	  University	  of	   Technology	   is	  
key.	   In	   1991,	   entities	   at	   Sharif	   purchased	   ring	   magnets	   from	   the	   German	   firm	   Thyssen.35	  
Another	  German	  company,	  Karl	  Schenck	  of	  Darmstadt	  (now	  simply	  Schenck),	  sent	  at	  least	  one	  
balancing	   machine	   to	   the	   university.	   The	   machines	   are	   used	   to	   balance	   equipment	   such	   as	  
turbines,	  pumps,	  and	  compressors.	  They	  are	  also	  used	  to	  balance	  uranium	  centrifuges.	  In	  1993,	  
the	  Swiss	  firms	  AGIE	  and	  Charmilles	  transferred	  electrical	  discharge	  machinery	  (EDMs)	  to	  Sharif.	  
EDM	   is	  a	  key	   to	  manufacturing	  molds	  and	   tools	   for	   the	  mass	  production	  of	  plastic	  and	  metal	  
arts,	  and	  useful	  in	  the	  machining	  of	  complex	  precision	  parts	  such	  as	  centrifuge	  components.36	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Iran	  is	  known	  to	  use	  nationals	  living	  abroad	  to	  procure	  needed	  material.	  The	  following	  
are	  some	  examples.	  In	  2002,	  Eddie	  Johansson,	  a	  37-­‐year-­‐old	  Swede	  of	  Iranian	  origin,	  allegedly	  
arranged	   for	   the	   purchase	   of	   44	   high-­‐voltage	   switches	   from	   the	   German	   company	   Behlke	  
Electronic	  GmbH.	   Johansson’s	   brother,	   Abdollah	  Nagash	   Souratgar,37	  reportedly	   sent	  German	  
mechanical	   engineer	  Harold	  Hemming	   a	   bank	   transfer	   of	   $72,337.80	   for	   the	  purchase	  of	   the	  
switches.	  Hemming	  asked	  his	  friend	  Eva-­‐Marie	  Hack	  to	  place	  the	  order	  for	  the	  switches	  under	  
the	  name	  of	  her	  company,	  CTC	  Offices	  Services.	  According	  to	   investigators,	   the	  company	  was	  
phony,	  lacking	  any	  staff	  or	  assets.38	  Between	  2002	  and	  2005,	  Mohammad	  Reza	  Vaghari	  and	  Mir	  
Hossein	  Ghaemi	  used	   their	   Saamen	  Company	   in	   Pennsylvania,	  U.S.A.,	   as	   cover	   to	   purchase	   a	  
number	  of	  laboratory	  instruments	  then	  send	  them	  to	  Iran	  via	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  (UAE).39	  
Between	   2007	   and	   2008,	   Jirair	   Avanessian,	   an	   Iranian	   living	   in	   California,	   and	  his	   associates	  
appear	  to	  have	  made	  more	  than	  seven	  shipments	  of	  vacuum	  pumps	  with	  uranium	  enrichment	  
applications	  to	  Iran.	  He	  re-­‐labeled	  and	  undervalued	  the	  contents	  of	  each	  shipment	  to	  mask	  the	  
true	  value	  of	   the	   contents	   and	  avoid	   interception	  by	  U.S.	  Officials.	   In	  most	   cases,	  Avanessian	  
prepared	   airway	   bills	   that	   mislabeled	   the	   contents	   as	   spare	   parts	   to	   avoid	   having	   to	   make	  
export	  declarations.40	  He	  directed	   the	  supplier	   to	   ship	   the	  equipment	   to	  a	  company	   in	  a	  UAE	  
free	   trade	   zone,	   thus	  making	   it	   appear	   that	   the	  UAE	   company	  was	   the	   ultimate	   destination.	  
Avanessian	  directed	  the	  company	  in	  the	  UAE	  to	  ship	  the	  material	  to	  an	  awaiting	  organization	  in	  
Iran.41	  And	  in	  March	  2009,	  Mahmoud	  Yadegari	  procured	  pressure	  transducers	  from	  a	  company	  
in	  Massachusetts	   and	   attempted	   to	   transport	   them	   to	   Iran	   through	  Canada.	   The	   transducers	  
have	  applications	  in	  uranium	  enrichment	  processes.42	  
The	  Iranians	  also	  use	  third	  parties	  such	  as	  the	  Khan	  network	  to	  acquire	  needed	  goods.	  
From	   the	   1980s	   through	   2003,	   Khan	   sold	   Iran	   centrifuge	   blueprints,	   pre-­‐forms,	   centrifuge	  
assemblies,	   a	   number	   of	   studies	   on	   the	   production	   of	   uranium	   hemispheres	   in	   nuclear	  
weapons,	  and	  nuclear	  weapon	  designs	  thought	  to	  be	  based	  on	  early	  Chinese	  models.43	  
Brazil	  	  
There	   is	   evidence	   that	   Brazil	   looked	   outwardly	   to	   find	   the	   technologies	   it	   needed	   to	  
establish	  its	  nuclear	  program.	  Some	  nonproliferation	  analysts	  such	  as	  David	  Albright	  note	  that	  it	  
was	  German	  manufacturers	  who	  helped	  Brazil	  establish	  its	  nuclear	  laboratories,	  design	  its	  first	  
centrifuges,	  and	  develop	  a	  pilot	  plant	  at	  Aramar.44	  Other	  analysts	  suspect	  that	  A.Q.	  Khan	  may	  
have	  helped	  Brazil	  obtain	  centrifuge	  designs	  and	  equipment	   for	   its	  program.	   In	  a	  2004	  media	  
interview,	   Henry	   Sokolski,	   asserted	   that	   Brazil’s	   centrifuges	   are	   similar	   to	   the	   P2	   centrifuge	  
design	   sold	   by	   Khan’s	   proliferation	   network	   to	   Iran	   and	   Libya.	   Although	   there	   may	   not	   be	  
enough	  evidence	  to	  suggest	   that	  Khan	  sold	   the	  centrifuges	   to	  Brazil,	   the	  government	  has	  not	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yet	  explained	  where	  the	  designs	  for	  its	  centrifuges	  originated.	  Brazil	  claims	  that	  next	  generation	  
centrifuges	  operating	  at	  a	  Resende	  commercial	  sized	  facility	  are	  direct	  descendants	  of	  those	  at	  
Aramar.	   In	   2004,	   Brazil’s	   reluctance	   to	   explain	   or	   exhibit	   these	   new	   technologies	   led	   to	   a	  
diplomatic	   crisis	  with	   the	   IAEA	  when	  Brazilian	   authorities	   refused	   to	   allow	  Agency	   inspectors	  
full	  access	  to	  Resende’s	  enrichment	  halls.	  Although	  Brazil’s	  Ministry	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology	  
maintains	  that	  the	  rotors	  used	  at	  Resende	  are	  entirely	  indigenous,	  experts	  such	  as	  Maria	  Rost	  
Rublee,	  suspect	  that	  Brazil	  concealed	  the	  source	  of	  Resende’s	  enrichment	  technology	  because	  
it	  may	  have	  indicated	  illegal	  or	  inappropriate	  procurement	  activity.	  	  
Libya	  
In	  the	  1990s,	  Libya	  contracted	  with	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  network	  for	  the	  materials	  needed	  to	  
develop	   an	   indigenous	   uranium	   enrichment	   program.	   Khan	   and	   his	   network	   provided	   the	  
Libyan	   authorities	   numerous	   items	   including	   20	   pre-­‐assembled	   uranium	   centrifuges	   and	  
enough	   components	   for	   an	   additional	   200	   first	   generation	   centrifuges.	   The	   network	   also	  
transferred	   10,000	   second	   generation	   centrifuges	   and	   supporting	   equipment	   including	   feed	  
stations,	   product	   and	   tails	   withdrawal	   stations,	   vacuum	   equipment,	   cascade	   piping,	   drive	  
systems	   and	   other	   miscellaneous	   equipment.	   Khan’s	   colleagues	   helped	   to	   manufacture	   and	  
ship	   the	   components	   and	   equipment	   from	   entities	   in	   over	   10	   countries.	   In	   addition,	   the	  
network	  provided	  Libya	   technical	  assistance	  and	  design	   information	  on	  a	  conversion	  and	   fuel	  
fabrication	   laboratory;	   a	   post-­‐irradiation	   examination	   facility,	   designed	   for	   the	   receipt	   and	  
disassembly	   of	   pressurized	   water	   reactor	   (PWR)	   spent	   fuel	   assemblies	   (“Project	   307”);	   a	  
radiochemical	   separation	   laboratory,	   consisting	   of	   a	   pilot	   scale	   Purex	   reprocessing	   plant	  
designed	   for	   processing	   approximately	   1100	   kg	   of	   uranium	   per	   year	   of	   PWR	   spent	   fuel	   and	  
recovering	   approximately	   10	   kg	   of	   plutonium	   per	   year	   (referred	   to	   as	   “Project	   701”);	   and	   a	  
high-­‐level	   liquid	   waste	   vitrification	   plant,	   designed	   for	   solidifying	   high-­‐level	   waste	   from	   a	  
reprocessing	  plant	   (“Project	   303”).	   	   Lastly,	   the	  Khan	  network	   saw	   to	   it	   that	   Libyan	  engineers	  
were	   trained	   in	   the	  use	  of	   some	  of	   the	  machines	   that	  were	  provided,	  and	  were	  given	  design	  
information	   for	   the	   fabrication	  of	  a	  nuclear	  explosive	  device,	   including	   information	  related	  to	  
high	   enriched	   uranium	   re-­‐conversion,	   casting	   and	   machining,	   and	   the	   testing	   of	   nuclear	  
weapons	  components.45	  
Syria	  
Syria	  too	  turned	  outward	  for	   foreign	  assistance	  to	  build	   its	  nuclear	  program.	  Although	  
the	  details	   are	  not	  well	   known,	   there	   is	  evidence	   that	  North	  Korean	  engineers	  were	   in	  Syria,	  
building	   a	   nuclear	   reactor	   similar	   to	   their	   own	   20-­‐25MWth	   reactor.46	  To	   support	   its	   contract	  
with	   the	  Syrians,	  North	  Korea	  employed	  one	  of	   its	  own	  procurement	  agents	   to	   travel	  abroad	  
13 
 
and	   purchase	   needed	   items.	   According	   to	   a	  Washington	   Post	   report,	   Western	   intelligence	  
tracked	  the	  activities	  of	   the	  North	  Korean	  company,	  Namchongang	  Trading	  Group	  (NCG).	  The	  
company’s	  employees	  traveled	  to	  several	  European	  countries	  such	  as	  Germany	  to	  purchase	  an	  
array	  of	  items	  such	  as	  electric	  timers,	  steel	  pipes,	  vacuum	  pumps,	  transformers,	  and	  aluminum	  
pipes	   cut	   to	   precise	   dimensions.	   These	   items	   were	   purchased	   and	   shipped	   to	   NCG’s	   branch	  
office	  in	  Beijing,	  China,	  then	  sent	  on	  to	  the	  Al-­‐Kibar	  site.47	  China	  is	  a	  nuclear	  weapon	  state,	  and	  
as	   such	   they	   have	   different	   import	   privileges	   than	   non-­‐nuclear	   weapon	   states.	   According	   to	  
David	  Albright,	  “Because	   it’s	  a	  branch	  office	   in	  China,	  NCG	  can	  buy	  equipment	  from	  suppliers	  
throughout	   the	   world,	   even	   in	   Europe	   and	   possibly	   the	   United	   States,	   particularly	   if	   the	  
companies	  have	  subsidiaries	  in	  China.”48	  As	  Albright	  pointed	  out,	  if	  items	  were	  being	  purchased	  
at	  a	  branch	  office	  in	  China,	  there	  may	  be	  little	  suspicion	  drawn	  to	  the	  transaction.49	  	  	  
Similarities	  in	  Network	  Procurement	  Practices	  
Looking	   at	   known	   illicit	   procurement	   cases,	   some	   similarities	   become	   apparent.	  
Networks	  usually	  start	  out	  affiliated	  with	  and	  organized	  by	  a	  state,	  which	  gives	  them	  the	  ability	  
to	  move	  around	  the	  world	  with	  ease.	  They	  use	  their	  nation’s	  embassies	  as	  bases	  for	  contacting	  
companies	   that	   manufacture	   necessary	   materials	   and	   use	   expats	   living	   in	   far	   off	   lands	   to	  
procure	   and	   ship	  materials.	  Networks	   use	   educational	   institutions,	   companies,	   and	   nonprofit	  
organizations	  as	  fronts	  to	  conceal	  procurement	  activities.	  They	  also	  used	  these	  fronts	  to	  flood	  
suppliers	  with	  procurement	  requests.	  Networks	  mislead	   local	  authorities	  by	  mislabeling	   items	  
to	   be	   shipped	   and	   order	   components	   then	   assemble	   them	   once	   reach	   their	   ultimate	  
destination.	   ISIS	  noted	   that	   trading	  companies	  are	  key	   to	   illicit	  procurement	  networks.	  These	  
companies	   barrage	   multiple	   suppliers	   with	   quotes	   and	   purchase	   requests,	   often	   to	   several	  
offices	  within	  the	  same	  company	  and	  even	  to	  subsidiaries	  in	  the	  hopes	  one	  order	  will	  be	  filled.50	  
They	  also	  exploit	  weaknesses	  in	  export	  control	  licensing	  application	  processes,	  by	  undervaluing	  
or	  mislabeling	  equipment	  on	  invoices	  and	  applications,	  thus	  avoiding	  necessary	  declarations.51	  
In	   some	   cases,	   countries,	   such	   as	   North	   Korea,	   have	   created	   firms	   that	   are	   really	   fronts.	  
Networks	  establish	   logistics	  routes	  through	  allied	  nations	  and	  those	  with	  weak	  export	  control	  
systems	  to	  move	  acquired	  goods	  and	  hide	  the	   location	  of	   true	  end	  users.	   	  Networks	  also	  use	  
offshore	  financial	  centers	  to	  pay	  for	  their	  entire	  activities.	  
In	   some	   cases,	   procurement	   networks	   emerge	   as	   quasi-­‐governmental,	   semi-­‐
independent	  bodies	   such	  as	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations,	   branches	  of	   the	  military,	   state-­‐
owned	  companies,	  and	  nonprofit	  or	  religious	  organizations.	  The	  Khan	  network	  may	  be	  the	  most	  
flagrant	  example,	  but	   there	  are	  others	   including	  branches	  of	   the	   Iranian	  Revolutionary	  Guard	  
Corps	  (IRGC)	  and	  Iran’s	  Bonyads	  –	  organizations	  that	  possess	  an	  independent	  authority	  beyond	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the	   reach	  of	   elected	  officials	   and	  other	   parts	   of	   the	   government,52	  and	  KAST	   in	   Japan.	   These	  
organizations	  are	  often	  created	  by	  the	  state	  ostensibly	  to	  purchase	  materials	  for	  their	  programs	  
and	   usually	   are	   given	   a	   high	   level	   of	   autonomy.	   In	   addition,	   some	   of	   these	   organizations	  
become	  both	   buyers	   and	   sellers.	   Lieggi,	   Shaw	   and	   Toki	   noted	   that	   “Similar	   to	   the	  A.Q.	   Khan	  
network,	  which	  coordinated	  imports	  into	  Pakistan	  and	  exports	  to	  Iran	  and	  Libya,	  North	  Korea’s	  
WMD-­‐related	  trade	  networks	  have	  both	  import	  and	  an	  export	  sides.”53	  
	  
Table	  1.	  Common	  Illicit	  Procurement	  Practices	  of	  Networks	  





Iraq	   Iran	   Brazil	   Libya	   Syria	  
Enlist	  nationals	  
living	  abroad	  
X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   	   	  
Send	  procurement	  
agents	  around	  the	  
world	  looking	  for	  
material	  
X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   	   	   	  
Use	  embassies	  and	  
fronts	  as	  basis	  for	  
of	  procurement	  	  









needed	  equipment	  	  
X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   	   	   	  
Mislabel	  items	  on	  
shipments	   X	   	   X	   X	   X	   	   	   	  
Flood	  suppliers	  
with	  requests	  
X	   	   	   X	   	   	   	   	  
Pay	  exaggerated	  
prices	  for	  items	  
X	   	   	   X	   	   	   	   	  
Transship	  materials	   X	   X	   X	   	   X	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Use	  third	  parties/	  
networks	  
X	   	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	  
	  
DETERRING	  AND	  INTERDICTING	  ILLICIT	  PROCUREMENT	  PROGRAMS	  
Efforts	   to	  deter,	   interdict,	  and	  shut	  down	   illicit	  procurement	  efforts	  can	  essentially	  be	  
put	  into	  two	  categories:	  International	  and	  domestic.	  	  Each	  has	  diplomatic,	  technical,	  regulatory,	  
and	  systematic	  components	  to	  them.	  
International	  Efforts	  
International	  efforts	  have	  come	  in	  the	  form	  of	  instruments	  related	  to	  trade	  security	  and	  
export	   controls.	   These	   include	   United	   Nations	   Security	   Council	   Resolutions	   1373	   and	   1540,	  
multilateral	   export	   control	   regimes	   such	   as	   the	   Nuclear	   Supplier’s	   Group	   (NSG)	   and	   Missile	  
Technology	  Control	   Regime	   (MTCR),	   and	   schemes	   such	   as	   the	   Proliferation	   Security	   Initiative	  
(PSI)	  and	  Container	  Security	  Initiative	  (CSI).	  Some	  of	  these	  are	  legally	  binding	  instruments	  and	  
some	   are	   more	   informal	   and	   voluntary	   in	   nature.	   The	   International	   Atomic	   Energy	   Agency	  
(IAEA),	  an	   international	  body,	  also	  has	  programs	  and	  regulations	   that	  aid	   in	   the	  verifying	  and	  
stopping	  the	  spread	  of	  sensitive	  technologies.	  These	  efforts	  are	  discussed	  below.	  
UN	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1373	  	  
UNSC	   Resolution	   1373,	   adopted	   in	   2001,	   calls	   for	   all	   states	   to	   become	   parties	   to	   the	  
relevant	   international	   conventions	   and	   protocols	   relating	   to	   terrorism,	   and	   obliges	   states	   to	  
criminalize	   any	   assistance	   to	   terrorist	   activities;	   deny	   financial	   support	   and	   safe	   haven	   to	  
terrorists;	  and	  exchange	  information	  for	  the	  prevention	  and	  prosecution	  of	  criminal	  acts.	  It	  also	  
emphasizes	   the	   need	   to	   strengthen	   a	   global	   response	   to	   the	   challenge	   of	   illicit	   trafficking.54	  
Although	  Resolution	  1373	  does	  not	  focus	  WMD	  related	  terrorism	  specifically,	  paragraphs	  3	  and	  
4	  of	   the	  Resolution	  does	   address	   terrorist	   possession	  of	   sensitive	  materials	   and	   trafficking	   in	  
such	  materials.”55	  
UN	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1540	  
Adopted	   in	   2004,	   UNSCR	   1540	   mandates	   that	   states	   undertake	   activities	   to	   prevent	  
domestic	   development	   and	   dissemination	   of	   weapons	   of	  mass	   destruction	   and	   their	   related	  
technologies.	  These	  measures	  include	  physical	  protection	  measures;	  border	  controls;	  actions	  to	  
detect,	  deter,	  and	  combat	  illicit	  trafficking;	  and	  export	  controls.	  The	  resolution	  also	  obliges	  all	  
states	   to	  adopt	  and	  enforce	  “appropriate	  effective	  measures”	   to	  prohibit	  any	  non-­‐state	  actor	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from	   manufacturing,	   acquiring,	   possessing,	   developing,	   transferring,	   or	   using	   nuclear	  
weapons.56	  To	  help	  administer	  activities	  under	  UNSCR	  1540,	  the	  Security	  Council	  created	  a	  sub-­‐
committee	  -­‐	  the	  1540	  Committee	  -­‐	   that	  functions	  as	  the	  repository	  of	  the	  national	  reports	  on	  
the	   implementation	   of	   the	   resolution	   and	   helps	   states	   acquire	   the	   necessary	   capabilities	   to	  
complete	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  Resolution.	  	  
Export	  Control	  Regimes	  
Four	  control	  regimes	  were	  developed	  as	  informal	  arrangements	  to	  control	  the	  transfer	  
of	  WMD	  relevant	  technologies.	  	  
The	  Nuclear	  Suppliers	  Group	   (NSG)	   is	   comprised	  of	  46	   states,	  more	   than	  half	  of	   them	  
nuclear	  technology	  suppliers.	  Regime	  members	  adhere	  to	  a	  common	  set	  of	  guidelines	  to	  ensure	  
that	   civilian	   trade	  does	  not	   facilitate	  nuclear	  weapons	  development.	   The	   IAEA	  publishes	  NSG	  
guidelines	   –	   INFCIRC	   254	   part	   I	   and	   dual-­‐use	   export	   guidelines,	   INFCIR	   254	   part	   II	   and	   their	  
revisions	  as	  they	  are	  updated.	  	  	  
The	  Missile	  Technology	  Control	  Regime	  (MTCR)	  is	  a	  group	  of	  states	  that	  share	  the	  goal	  
of	  controlling	  the	  spread	  of	  technologies	  related	  to	  missiles,	  space	  delivery	  systems,	  unmanned	  
delivery	  systems,	  and	  subsystems	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  deliver	  a	  weapon	  of	  mass	  destruction.	  	  
Design	   facilities	   are	   also	   covered	   in	   the	   controls,	   as	   are	  missile	   related	   components	   such	   as	  
engines,	  propellants,	  navigational	  equipment,	  and	  surfaces.	  	  
The	  Australia	  Group	  (AG)	  is	  an	  informal	  arrangement	  to	  minimize	  the	  risk	  of	  spreading	  
material	   and	  equipment	   that	  may	  be	  useful	   for	  developing	  biological	   and	   chemical	  weapons.	  
The	   Group	   updates	   a	   list	   of	   sensitive	   substances	   to	   guide	   member’s	   control	   policies,	   and	  
members	  agree	  to	  use	  it	  for	  that	  purpose	  along	  with	  a	  pledge	  to	  adopt	  catch-­‐all	  controls	  as	  a	  
means	  of	  controlling	  sensitive	  exports	  to	  suspect	  entities.	  	  
The	  Wassenaar	   Arrangement	   is	   an	   informal	   agreement	   between	   a	   group	   of	   states	   to	  
control	   the	   transfer	  of	   conventional	  weapons	  and	   sensitive	  dual-­‐use	  goods	  and	   technologies.	  
The	   Arrangement	   also	   has	   an	   established	   set	   of	   lists	   of	   items	   to	   be	   controlled.	   It	   promotes	  
transparency	  and	  responsibility	  in	  trade,	  and	  the	  exchange	  of	  information	  related	  to	  the	  trade	  
of	  controlled	  items.57	  
Proliferation	  Security	  Initiative	  (PSI)	  
The	  Proliferation	  Security	  Initiative	  (PSI)	  is	  a	  voluntary,	  informal	  initiative	  designed	  to	  fill	  
gaps	  in	  the	  multilateral	  WMD	  regime.58	  The	  focus	  of	  PSI	   is	  to	  promote	  cooperation	  in	  counter	  
proliferation	   activities,	   in	   particular	   those	   focused	   on	   stopping	   the	   spread	   of	   WMD	   related	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technologies.	   With	   over	   ninety	   members,	   the	   PSI	   has	   been	   important	   in	   monitoring	   and	  
interdicting	   WMD	   related	   trade.	   However,	   many	   states	   (including	   China)	   resist	   joining	   the	  
initiative	   due	   to	   concerns	   over	   the	   legality	   of	   U.S.–led	   interdiction	   activities	   that	   operate	  
outside	  the	  UN	  framework.	  Other	  states	  are	  reluctant	  to	  adopt	  the	  initiative	  officially	  because	  
they	  view	  it	  as	  an	  unwelcome	  component	  of	  U.S.	  strategic	  dominance.	  Finally,	  some	  states	  are	  
wary	   of	   steps	   that	   could	   be	   construed	   as	   a	   political	   decision	   to	   strategically	   align	   with	   the	  
United	  States,	  thus	  upsetting	  the	  fragile	  balance	  of	  power	  within	  their	  region.	  	  	  
The	  International	  Atomic	  Energy	  Agency	  (IAEA)	  
Underlying	   the	   entire	   nuclear	   nonproliferation	   regime	   is	   of	   course	   the	   Nuclear	   Non-­‐
Proliferation	  Treaty	  (NPT).	  The	   IAEA	   implements	  the	  activities	  set	   for	   in	  the	  NPT.	  The	  Agency,	  
established	   in	   1968,	   serves	   –	   to	   some	   extent	   –	   as	   an	   institutional	   barrier	   to	   proliferation	  
activities.	  Over	  the	  years,	  the	  IAEA	  has	  undergone	  quite	  a	  few	  changes	  to	  attempt	  to	  manage	  
the	   challenges	   created	   by	   new	  proliferation	   threats.	  Nuclear	   safeguards	   and	   nuclear	   security	  
activities	   are	   those	   that	   attempt	   to	   ensure	   that	   nuclear	   technologies	   are	   being	   used	   for	  
purposes	  and	  the	  nuclear	  and	  radiological	  materials	  within	  a	  state	  is	  secure	  from	  malicious	  acts	  
again	  it.	  The	  IAEA	  has	  always	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  international	  efforts	  to	  control	  the	  spread	  
of	  nuclear	  technologies.	  As	  noted	  earlier,	  the	  Agency	  maintains	  and	  updates	  the	  Trigger	  List	  –	  
nuclear	  material,	  equipment	  and	  non-­‐nuclear	  materials	  (INFCIRC/254/Part	  1)	  and	  Dual-­‐Use	  List	  
-­‐	  nuclear-­‐related	  dual-­‐use	  equipment	  and	  materials	  and	  related	  technology	  (INFCIRC/254/Part	  
2).	  These	  lists	  trigger	  nuclear	  safeguards	  at	  the	  IAEA	  and	  are	  used	  as	  control	   lists	  for	  member	  
states.	   In	   2004,	   after	   the	   Khan	   network	   was	   uncovered	   and	   Iran	   and	   Libyan	   illicit	   activities	  
examined,	   the	   IAEA	   began	   to	   investigate	   potential	   covert	   procurement	   activities	   around	   the	  
world.	  Born	  out	  of	  that	  activity	  the	  Nuclear	  Trade	  and	  Technology	  Analysis	  Unit	  (TTA)	  –	  within	  
the	  Department	  of	  Safeguards	  –	  it	  now	  uses	  experts	  in	  technical	  and	  trade	  issues	  to	  analyze	  any	  
related	   activities,	   to	   support	   verification	   activities,	   and	   during	   the	   preparation	   of	   state	  
evaluations.	   In	   2006,	   TTA	   launched	   the	   Procurement	   Outreach	   Program	   to	   facilitate	   states’	  
voluntarily	   provision	   of	   relevant	   nuclear	   trade	   related	   data.	   This	   data	   includes	   suspicious	  
procurement	  inquiries	  received	  by	  companies	  and	  on	  occasion,	  state	  authorities	  have	  released	  
information	  on	  export	  denials.	  	  
Other	  international	  organizations	  such	  as	  Interpol	  and	  the	  World	  Customs	  Organization	  
have	  played	  roles	  as	  forums	  for	  sharing	  information	  about	  possible	  illicit	  procurement	  activities,	  





Across	   the	   globe,	   countries	   have	   entered	   into	   partnerships	   to	   cooperate	   in	   areas	   of	  
information	   sharing,	   law	   enforcement,	   and	   interdiction	   techniques,	   and	   assisted	   partners	   to	  
strengthen	   their	   own	   national	   programs.	   The	   U.S.	   has	   a	   number	   of	   programs	   to	   work	   with	  
international	   partners	   to	   deploy	   radiation	   detection	   systems	   at	   international	   crossing	   points,	  
airports,	  and	  seaports,	  and	  to	  provide	  mobile	  systems	  for	  use	  at	  interior	  checkpoints	  to	  detect	  
and	   deter	   illicit	   transfer	   of	   nuclear	   and	   other	   radioactive	   sources.	   	   The	   U.S.	   Department	   of	  
Energy’s	   Confidence-­‐Building	   Measures	   Program	   is	   advancing	   international	   cooperation	   in	  
nonproliferation	   nuclear	   forensics.	   It	   applies	   scientific	   techniques	   to	   identify	   unique	  
characteristics	  of	  nuclear	  and	  radioactive	  material.59	  	  
Domestic	  Efforts	  
So	   far,	   nations	   have	   applied	   varying	   levels	   of	   protection	   against	   the	   flow	   of	   sensitive	  
materials	   inside	   and	   across	   their	   borders.	   These	   levels	   of	   protection	   include	   licensing	  
procedures,	   border	   controls,	   customs	   regulations,	   law	   enforcement	   techniques,	   intelligence	  
collection,	  and	  analytic	  activities.	  	  	  
HOW	  DO	  NETWORKS	  CONTINUE	  TO	  OPERATE?	  
With	  so	  many	  controls	  in	  place,	  how	  do	  networks	  continue	  to	  operate?	  It	  appears	  that	  
there	  are	  numerous	  gaps	  in	  both	  international	  and	  national	  control	  activities.	  	  
Existential	  Challenges	  
New	  technologies	  in	  transportation	  and	  communication	  have	  both	  facilitated	  increases	  
in	   trade	  between	  nations	   and	  overwhelmed	  efforts	   to	  detect	   and	   interdict	   the	   illicit	   trade	  of	  
sensitive	  materials.	  Globalization,	  defined	  as	   the	   integration	  of	  markets	  and	  technologies	   in	  a	  
way	  that	  enables	  individuals	  and	  corporations	  to	  reach	  around	  the	  world	  farther,	  faster,	  deeper	  
and	  cheaper	  than	  ever	  before,	  has	  translated	  to	  new	  methods	  for	  moving	  materials	  both	  legally	  
and	   illegally,	   which	   in	   turn	   has	   manifested	   into	   exponential	   growth	   of	   world	   trade	   and	  
interdependence	   between	   nations	   for	   all	   kinds	   of	   goods. 60 	  The	   evolutionary	   process	   has	  
enabled	  manufacturers	  to	  purchase	  components	  from	  one	  country,	  assemble	  them	  in	  another,	  
and	  ship	  a	  finished	  product	  to	  yet	  another	  country	  for	  final	  use.	  This	  new	  "modular”	  approach	  
to	  manufacturing	  means	  that	  very	  few	  things	  are	  made	  in	  one	  factory	  anymore,	  but	  instead	  are	  
now	  assembled	   from	  component	  parts	   that	   come	   from	  a	  variety	  of	   locations,	   some	  national,	  
some	   international.	  Law	  enforcement	  and	  export	  control	  authorities	  struggle	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  
the	   flow	   of	   materials	   between	   suppliers	   and	   their	   customers.	   Authorities	   also	   have	   trouble	  
keeping	  up	  with	  the	  flow	  of	  materials	   through	  subsidiary	  companies	  that	  are	  spread	  over	  the	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world.	  The	  partitioning	  of	  corporate	  functions	  and	  offices	  to	  remote	  corners	  of	  the	  world	  has	  
impeded	  the	  monitoring	  capabilities	  of	  law	  enforcement	  and	  other	  agencies.	  Thus,	  globalization	  
albeit	   a	   wonderful	   trend	   for	   world	   economics,	   and	   a	   smuggler’s	   dream,	   is	   also	   law	  
enforcement’s	  nightmare.	  	  	  
Nuclear	  suppliers	  have	  been	  gearing	  up	  for	  the	  expansion	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  around	  the	  
world.	  Countries	  are	  building	  nuclear	   reactors	   to	   cope	  with	   their	   future	  energy	  needs	  and	   to	  
find	  cleaner	  means	  of	  producing	  energy.	  Subsequently,	   industrial	  growth	  may	  be	  attractive	  to	  
procurement	  networks.	  	  
Then	   there	   is	   the	   profit	   potential	   for	   would	   be	   smugglers	   to	   move	   goods	   from	   or	  
through	  their	  country.	  Peter	  Crail,	  a	  nonproliferation	  expert	  notes	  that	  much	  like	  other	  forms	  of	  
smuggling	  or	  highly	  profitable	  illegal	  activity,	  the	  profit	  motive	  in	  selling	  sensitive	  technologies	  
is	  too	  strong	  to	  shut	  down	  such	  activities	  entirely.61	  There	  appears	  to	  always	  be	  someone	  within	  
the	  firm	  that	  is	  willing	  to	  do	  almost	  anything	  for	  money.	  According	  to	  Crail,	  “Those	  who	  see	  any	  
potential	   for	   profit	   without	   getting	   caught	   will	   indeed	   find	   ways	   to	   circumvent	   existing	  
controls.”62	  	  	  
International	  Challenges	  
On	   the	   international	   level,	   export	   control	   instruments	   are	   limited	   by	   four	   common	  
flaws:	  first,	  unclear	  obligations,	  many	  of	  which	  are	  voluntary,	  therefore	  are	  not	  legally	  binding;	  
second,	  there	  is	  insufficient	  agreement	  on	  the	  threat;	  third	  there	  are	  unsatisfactory	  standards	  
and	  disagreement	  on	  what	  standards	  should	  be;	  and	  fourth,	  there	  is	  inadequate	  monitoring	  of	  
implementation	  and	  poor	  use	  of	  other	  existing	  multilateral	  tools	  to	  support	  them.	  For	  example,	  
although	   UNSC	   Resolution	   1540	   could	   be	   an	   important	   pillar	   in	   protecting	   against	   illicit	  
trafficking	  activity,	   it	  has	  not	  become	  that	  because	  nations	  have	  been	  slow	  to	   implement	  the	  
resolution’s	  mandates	  fully.	  During	  a	  2009	  review	  of	  the	  Resolution,	  experts	  assessed	  that	  there	  
were	  particularly	   low	   levels	  of	   implementation	   in	  certain	  areas	  such	  as	  physical	  protection	  of	  
nuclear	  materials,	  in	  measures	  for	  border	  and	  export	  controls	  of	  nuclear-­‐related	  materials	  and	  
in	  all	  aspects	  of	  state	  enforcement	  of	  national	  controls.	  	  
Other	  international	  entities	  often	  find	  themselves	  without	  authority	  and	  unable	  to	  take	  
any	   action	   if	   they	   did	   find	   suspected	   activity.	   This	   is	   the	   case	   at	   the	   IAEA	   Department	   of	  
Safeguards	   where	   the	   TTA	   investigates	   suspicious	   transactions,	   but	   is	   not	   able	   to	   do	   the	  
intrusive	  investigation	  necessary	  to	  uncover	  a	  network.	  Even	  if	  they	  did,	  the	  IAEA	  would	  be	  not	  
be	   able	   to	   do	  more	   than	   confront	   a	   nation	   and	   offer	   up	   evidence	   of	   suspicious	   activity.	   The	  
same	   holds	   true	   for	   the	   Office	   of	   Nuclear	   Security	   where	   the	   role	   is	   not	   much	   more	   than	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advisory	   to	   the	  Agency’s	  member	   states.	   The	   IAEA’s	   limited	   authority	   is	   tied	   to	   fundamental	  
debates	  among	   its	  member	  states	  over	   interpretation	  of	   the	  threat,	  what	   to	  do	  about	   it,	  and	  
how	  much	  control	  nations	  are	  willing	  to	  give	  to	  the	  Agency	  to	  try	  to	  quell	  the	  threat.	  	  
Another	   international	  challenge	   is	   in	  the	  area	  of	   information	  sharing	  between	  nations.	  
Often	   there	   is	   a	   contradiction	   between	   the	   need	   to	   focus	   on	   domestic	   efforts	   and	   sharing	  
information	  to	  facilitate	  international	  counter-­‐proliferation	  efforts.	  A	  stumbling	  block	  to	  sharing	  
internal	   information	  regarding	  nuclear	  capable	   individuals	  and	  organizations	   is	  confidentiality,	  
as	   this	   information	   could	   be	   classified	   from	   a	   national	   security	   perspective.	   The	   public	  
disclosure	   of	   such	   information	   could	   make	   these	   individuals	   or	   organizations	   targets	   for	  
proliferators.63	  Additionally,	  economic	  difficulties	  could	  arise	  if	  companies	  were	  shut	  down	  due	  
to	   suspicious	   activities.	   Without	   specific	   proof,	   national	   governments	   may	   not	   be	   willing	   to	  
make	  arrests	  or	  close	  businesses	  until	  after	  investigations	  have	  been	  completed.	  
Domestic	  Challenges	  
Although	  nations	  have	  come	  to	  some	  common	  understanding	  of	  the	  problems	  that	  stem	  
from	   illicit	   trade	   and	   terrorism	   related	   activities,	   they	   have	   yet	   to	   come	   to	   a	   consensus	  
regarding	  the	  seriousness	  of	   the	  threat	  and	  what	  to	  do	  about	   it.	  Dr.	  Douglas	  Shaw	  at	  George	  
Washington	  University	  asserted	  that	  “Illicit	  trafficking	  is	  complex	  and	  diverse,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  
efforts	   to	   suppress	   one	   element	   of	   illicit	   trafficking	   can	   facilitate	   other	   elements	   of	   the	  
activity.”64	  To	  be	  sure,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	   issues	  that	   impede	  the	  control	  of	  materials	   in	  a	  
country.	  An	  example	  is	  the	  way	  governments	  are	  implementing	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1540.	  Because	  
some	  do	   not	   agree	   on	   the	   danger	   that	   non-­‐state	   actors	   pose	   to	   them,	   they	   do	   not	   take	   the	  
same	  actions	  as	  others	  to	  ensure	  that	  bad	  actors	  are	  not	  operating	  within	  their	  borders.	  This	  is	  
only	   partly	   due	   to	   the	   ambiguity	   within	   the	   language	   of	   the	   resolution	   regarding	   its	  
implementation.	  
Some	   states	   believe	   that	   efforts	   to	   stop	   proliferation	   only	   benefit	   the	   interests	   of	  
established	  nuclear	  weapon	  states	  and	  do	  not	  serve	  any	  larger	  international	  interest	  to	  prevent	  
nuclear	  war.	  This	   is	   the	  classic	  North-­‐South	  debate	  between	  the	  nuclear	  haves	  and	  the	  have-­‐
nots.	  Non-­‐Aligned	  Movement	  (NAM)	  countries	  have	  always	  been	  sensitive	  about	  accepting	  any	  
policy	  that	  may	  slow	  down	  their	  continued	  economic	  development.	  As	  noted,	  some	  countries	  
are	  planning	   for	   a	   growing	  energy	  demand	   to	   support	   their	  burgeoning	  economies.	   They	  are	  
doing	   all	   they	   can	   to	   increase	   their	   energy	   production	   capacity,	   which	   in	   most	   cases	   has	  
included	  developing	   or	   expanding	   their	   nuclear	   power	   production	   capabilities.	   Any	  measures	  
that	  would	  stall	  growth	  would	  be	  looked	  down	  upon	  by	  these	  nations,	  and	  considered	  a	  form	  of	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discrimination	  by	  developed	  countries.	  This	  may	  also	  be	  the	  reason	  that	  these	  nations	  continue	  
to	   interpret	   their	   nonproliferation	   obligations	   in	   ways	   that	   they	   see	   will	   not	   hamper	   their	  
economic	  objects.	  Although	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  world	  is	  increasingly	  behaving	  as	  though	  it	  were	  a	  
part	  of	  a	  single	  market,	  nations	  still	  wish	  to	  maintain	  their	  sovereignty	  and	  continue	  to	  work	  to	  
benefit	   their	   own	   economic	   goals.	   Some	   states	   appear	   to	   be	   concerned	   about	   proliferation	  
activities	  only	  when	   they	  are	  a	  direct	   threat	   to	   their	  own	  national	   interests.	  Therefore,	   these	  
states	  pay	  little	  attention	  to	  curbing	  international	  illicit	  procurement	  activities.	  	  
States	   may	   not	   have	   the	   legislative	   instruments,	   customs,	   procedures,	   or	   law	  
enforcement	  resources	  necessary	  to	  fully	  control	  firms	  with	  relevant	  knowledge,	  products,	  and	  
or	   technologies.	   In	   other	   countries	   cultural	   stigma	   and	   distrust	   of	   authority	   minimizes	   any	  
control	  over	  economies	  and	  commerce.	   In	  still	  other	  cases	  prosecutorial	  effectiveness	  can	  be	  
undermined	   by	   the	   application	   of	   local	   laws	   that	   frustrate	   legal	   suits	   against	   suspects	   in	   the	  
gathering	  of	  evidence,	  and	  limitations	  of	  extradition.65	  	  
Conflicts	  of	  interest	  between	  government	  entities	  may	  make	  implementation	  of	  controls	  
difficult.	  In	  Malaysia	  for	  instance,	  although	  export	  controls	  are	  aware	  of	  their	  weaknesses,	  they	  
are	  working	  to	  change	  their	  regulations.	  In	  their	  regulatory	  culture,	  newly	  passed	  legislation	  has	  
been	  slow	  to	  be	  accepted	  by	  industry	  or	  enforced	  by	  local	  agencies.	  	  
Still	   other	   states	   have	   a	   strong	   incentive	   to	   acquire	   nuclear	   weapon	   technologies	   or	  
reach	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  capability	  to	  develop	  weapons	  in	  case	  they	  are	  required.66	  Many	  believe	  
this	  is	  the	  case	  of	  countries	  such	  as	  Japan	  and	  Iran.	  
Network	  Characteristics	  
Do	  the	  structure	  and	  characteristics	  of	  networks	  enable	  them	  to	  continue	  to	  operate?	  
According	   to	  Albright	  and	  his	  colleagues,	  “Networks	  are	  often	  small	  and	  dispersed	  within	   the	  
immense	  network	  of	  global	  business.	  The	   legitimate	  global	  market	   is	  enormous.”67	  Therefore,	  
the	  job	  of	  detecting	  an	  illicit	  network	  is	  difficult.	  Enquiries	  from	  smuggling	  networks	  are	  only	  a	  
tiny	  fraction	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  enquiries	  a	  supplier	  receives.	  In	  2010,	  a	  European	  company	  
calculated	   that	   only	   one-­‐tenth	   of	   a	   percent	   of	   all	   of	   the	   inquiries	   raised	   red	   flags.68	  It	   is	   no	  
wonder	   then	   that	   it	   is	   difficult	   for	   some	   suppliers	   to	   discern	   legitimate	   from	   illegitimate	  
enquiries.	  	  
Networks	  are	  flexible	  and	  resilient	  making	  their	  elimination	  difficult.	  They	  can	  use	  one	  
trading	  company,	  business	  or	  contact,	  then	  quit	  using	  it	  and	  move	  on	  to	  another.	  Networks	  are	  
always	   identifying	   new	   partners	   and	   avenues	   to	   do	   their	   business.	   They	   are	   also	   always	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changing	   partners,	   growing	   and	   shrinking,	   thus	   making	   them	   unfixed,	   ever	   changing,	   and	  
difficult	   to	   detect	   and	   pin	   down	   for	   any	   amount	   of	   time.69	  Hugh	   Griffiths	   noted	   that	   “the	  
problem	  with	  illicit	  procurement	  networks	  is	  that	  many	  of	  the	  actors	  with	  whom	  they	  engage	  
are	   actually	   legitimate	   companies…	   In	   many	   cases	   only	   it’s	   only	   the	   apex	   actors	   that	   are	  
knowingly	  engaged	  in	  an	  illicit	  procurement	  network.”70	  New	  suppliers	  are	  always	  emerging	  in	  
developing	  markets	   (countries	  and	   regions),	   that	  may	  have	  varying	  degrees	  understanding	  of	  
the	  problem,	  thus	  causing	  fluctuations	  in	  the	  overall	  control	  of	  trade.71	  Another	  characteristic	  is	  
the	   adaptability	   of	   networks.	   According	   to	   Griffiths	   “Adversarial	   networks/actors	   engaged	   in	  
the	   procurement	   of	  WMD/dual	   use	   goods	   have	   adopted	   the	  methodologies	   used	   by	   various	  
south	   and	   central	   American	   cartels/drug	   trafficking	   organizations	   and	   their	   partners	   in	  
Europe.”72	  Why?	  The	  cartels	  were	  faced	  with	  the	  best	  resources	  and	  control	  regimes	  and	  were	  
able	  to	  adapt	  and	  evolve	  in	  order	  to	  transport	  their	  product	  and	  import	  the	  precursors	  that	  are	  
essential	  to	  manufacturing	  their	  product.73	  Dr.	  Paulo	  Barretto	  of	  Texas	  A	  &	  M	  University	  added	  
that,	   “There	   is	   not	  much	  difference	  between	  an	   illicit	   nuclear	   procurement	  network	   and	   any	  
other	   illicit	   network,	   be	   it	   on	   arms	   trade	   or	   drug	   distribution	   network.	   The	   actors,	   their	  
motivation	   and	   outreach	   activities	   are	   similar.”74	  It	   is	   also	   necessary	   to	   be	   honest	   about	   the	  
problem	  and	  admit	   (as	  Crail	  did	  earlier)	   that	   illicit	   trafficking	  of	  nuclear	   technologies,	   just	   like	  
any	  other	  commodity,	  is	  profitable.	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  always	  going	  to	  be	  great	  determination	  
by	  would	  be	  suppliers	  to	  enter	  into	  this	  business	  and	  stay	  in	  it,	  sometimes	  finding	  new	  ways	  to	  
circumvent	  existing	  control.	  New	  technologies	   too	  could	  also	  emerge	   that	  would	   simplify	   the	  
task	  of	  making	  weapons	  easier	  and	  possibly	  easier	  to	  mask	  from	  investigators.	  Many	  networks	  
sit	   behind	   the	   veil	   of	   government	   administrations,	  which	  makes	   them	  even	  more	   difficult	   to	  
identify,	  understand	  fully,	  and	  disband	  externally.	  	  	  
	  
Table	  2.	  Problems	  Of	  Existing	  Export	  Control	  Regime	  and	  Possible	  Solutions	  
Existential	  Challenges	  
(inherent	  factors	  stemming	  from	  
evolving	  worldwide	  business	  and	  
science	  trends)	  
Affect	  On	  the	  Regime	   Solutions	  
• Globalization	   • Difficulty	  to	  keep	  track	  of	  
queries	  and	  movement	  of	  
goods	  
• Greater	  cooperation	  in	  monitoring,	  
and	  law	  enforcement.	  
• Coordination	  in	  licensing	  	  
• New	  suppliers	  entering	  
the	  market	  all	  the	  time	  	  
• May	  not	  have	  adequate	  
regulatory	  structure	  
• Little	  or	  no	  controls	  established	  
within	  the	  supplier	  organization	  
• Easy	  targets	  for	  illicit	  networks	  
• Lists	  of	  companies	  need	  updating	  
continuously	  
• Information	  sharing	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• New	  relevant	  technologies	  
emerging	  
• May	  not	  yet	  be	  classified	  
and	  regulated	  
• May	  facilitate	  weapons	  
development	  and/or	  
circumvent	  controls	  
• Continued	  monitoring	  of	  research	  
into	  sensitive	  technologies.	  	  
• Consulting	  with	  partners	  and	  relevant	  
control	  groups	  to	  keep	  them	  
informed.	  
• Apply	  appropriate	  regulations	  to	  
technologies	  as	  soon	  as	  is	  
appropriate.	  
• Smuggling	  is	  profitable	   • Suppliers	  maybe	  persuaded	  to	  
trade	  
• Increase	  the	  potential	  cost	  of	  sales	  to	  
suspicious	  buyers:	  
o Blacklists	  
o Suspension	  from	  trade	  if	  caught	  
o Fines	  
o Longer	  jail	  sentences	  
• Increase	  the	  possibility	  of	  getting	  
caught:	  
o Strengthen	  licensing	  procedures	  
o Increase	  national	  inspection	  
regime	  
o Better	  monitoring	  of	  sales	  and	  
rumors	  of	  sales	  
International	  Challenges	   Affects	  on	  the	  Regime	   Solutions	  
• Inadequate	  adherence	  to	  
some	  international	  
treaties	  (i.e.	  	  1373	  and	  
1540)	  
• Gaps	  in	  implementation	   • Assessments	  and	  consultations	  
between	  the	  1540	  committee	  and	  
national	  representatives	  
• Unclear	  obligations	   • Gaps	  in	  implementation	   • Clarify	  requirements	  
o Define	  them	  better	  
o Education	  and	  training	  
	  
• Insufficient	  agreement	  on	  
the	  threat	  
• Because	  nations	  cannot	  agree	  
on	  the	  level	  of	  threat	  against	  
them,	  they	  cannot	  agree	  on	  the	  
necessary	  level	  of	  measures	  to	  
take	  
• Better	  sharing	  of	  information	  about	  
the	  threat	  
	  
• Discuss	  and	  come	  to	  an	  agreed	  level	  
of	  threat	  or	  a	  matrix	  describing	  
threat	  levels	  
	  
• Some	  nations	  see	  any	  
nonproliferation	  activities	  
as	  discriminatory	  and	  
• Nations	  do	  not	  fully	  apply	  
nonproliferation	  and	  export	  
control	  measures	  
• Consultations	  between	  NWS,	  
industrialized	  states,	  and	  NAM	  
• Address	  nation’s	  issues	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o Political	  	  
• Find	  compromises	  
o Possibly	  provide	  incentives	  (not	  
threats)	  or	  sliding	  scales	  on	  
measures	  to	  take	  into	  account	  
economic	  and	  culture	  factors	  
• Weak	  national	  export	  
controls	  
• Materials	  flow	  unregulated	   • Assistance	  and	  continued	  partnership	  
o Assistance	  	  missions	  
o Follow-­‐up	  missions	  
• Weak	  legislation	   • Legislation	  has	  loopholes	  and	  
not	  enough	  strength	  
• Guidance	  and	  assistance	  from	  other	  
nations	  and	  some	  international	  
organizations	  (i.e.,	  IEA,	  IAEA)	  
• Weak	  national	  customs	  
regulations	  and	  law	  
enforcement	  	  
• Bad	  guys	  are	  undiscovered	  or	  
not	  apprehended	  
• More	  assistance	  from	  outside	  entities	  
o International	  Organizations	  (i.e.,	  
Interpol,	  Europol)	  	  	  
o Nations	  (i.e.,	  U.S.A.,	  Japan)	  
• Competing	  interests	  and	  
resources	  
• Programs	  are	  not	  fully	  
implemented	  
• Assistance	  
• Education	  from	  international	  
organizations	  and	  partners	  
	  
Network	  Characteristics	   Affects	  on	  the	  Regime	   Solutions	  
• Small	  and	  dispersed	   • Difficult	  to	  detect	   • Greater	  intelligence	  efforts,	  watch	  
lists	  
• Flexible	  and	  resilient	   • Hard	  to	  ascertain	  the	  true	  size	  
or	  core	  structure	  
• Track	  and	  analyze	  data	  regarding	  
suspicious	  business	  activities	  and	  
entities	  
• WMD	  networks	  have	  
adopted	  successful	  
smuggling	  methods	  or	  
other	  networks	  of	  other	  
commodities	  (i.e.	  drugs,	  
humans,	  etc.	  	  
• Difficult	  to	  detect	  or	  squash	   • Work	  with	  local	  and	  national	  law	  
enforcement	  to	  use	  analogous	  
methods	  to	  stop	  these	  networks	  
	  
STRENGTHENING	  EXISTING	  PROGRAMS	  
There	  are,	  of	  course,	  various	  ways	  to	  tackle	  each	  of	  the	  deficiencies	  that	  we	  found	  while	  
doing	  this	  research,	  but	  as	  noted	  earlier,	  there	  is	  no	  silver	  bullet	  or	  bullets	  that	  if	  implemented	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would	   shut	  down	  all	  networks	  or	  prevent	  others	   from	  being	  established.	  However,	   there	  are	  
actions	   that	  we	  can	  take	  to	  strengthen	  current	  controls	  and	   improve	  the	  effectiveness	  of	   the	  
export	  control	  regime.	  What	  all	  these	  improvements	  point	  to	  is	  the	  need	  for	  the	  international	  
community	   to	   come	   to	   a	   consensus	   regarding	   the	   threat	   and	   the	   need	   to	   tackle	   it	   together.	  
What	   is	   needed	   is	   the	  development	  of	   an	   international	   body	   to	   standardize	   levels	   of	   control	  
measures	   internationally,	   verify	   the	   implementation	   of	   those	   measures,	   and	   coordinate	  
nonproliferation	   activities	   across	   the	   board.	   The	   preferable	  method	   of	   establishing	   this	   body	  
would	  be	  to	  use	  an	  existing	  organization	  such	  as	  the	  1540	  Committee	  or	  the	   IAEA	  and	  give	   it	  
authority	   and	   responsibility	   for	   implementing	   standardization	   and	   verification	  measures.	   The	  
body	  could	  perform	  objective	  inspections,	  monitoring,	  and	  report	  the	  status	  of	  implementation	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  level	  of	  threat	  internationally.	  It	  could	  also	  help	  strengthen	  regional	  and	  national	  
programs	  to	  maintain	  and	  effective	  international	  control	  regime.	  	  
Domestically,	   government	   agencies	   need	   to	   cooperate	   more	   fully	   with	   businesses	   to	  
stop	  outside	  buyers	   from	  acquiring	   sensitive	  materials.	  Agencies	  need	   to	   communicate	  more	  
clearly	  with	  businesses	  to	  make	  them	  aware	  that	  they	  are	  being	  targeted	  by	  suspicious	  entities.	  
This	   approach	   will	   help	   to	   deter	   some	   would-­‐be	   suppliers	   from	   illegal	   acts,	   no	   matter	   how	  
profitable	  they	  may	  be.	  
In	   a	   war	   against	   those	   who	   will	   purchase	   for	   others	   and	   those	   who	   are	   developing	  
weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction,	  manufacturers	  and	  distributors	  are	  on	  the	  front	  line.	  Economists	  
will	   confirm	   that	   the	   law	   of	   supply	   and	   demand	   will	   dictate	   the	   market,	   no	   matter	   how	  
stringent	  the	  rules	  against	  selling	  particular	  items.	  If	  the	  potential	  for	  profits	  is	  high	  enough	  and	  
the	   possible	   risks	   of	   getting	   caught	   are	   low	   enough,	   criminals	   and	   people	  who	   are	   normally	  
honest	  will	  find	  a	  way	  lie,	  cheat,	  steal,	  or	  transfer	  any	  goods	  to	  a	  eager	  buyer.	  Therefore,	  what	  
needs	  to	  be	  done	  is	  to	  raise	  the	  potential	  for	  getting	  caught	  buying	  sensitive	  goods	  so	  they	  will	  
not	  do	  it.	  Only	  then	  will	  networks	  stop	  their	  attempts	  to	  acquire	  materials	  in	  certain	  areas.	  
To	  increase	  the	  chance	  of	  detecting	  suspicious	  enquiries,	  responsible	  companies	  should	  
establish	   trade	   control	   offices	   and	   train	   their	   personnel	   to	   spot	   suspicious	   procurement	  
patterns.	   Identifying	   suspicious	   enquiries	   can	   improve	   the	   chance	   of	   early	   detection	   of	  
trafficking	  networks	  before	  an	  order	  is	  made	  or	  any	  goods	  are	  shipped.75	  According	  to	  Albright,	  
“To	   increase	   the	   chance	   of	   detecting	   suspicious	   enquiries,	   responsible	   companies	   establish	  
centralized	   trade	   control	   offices	   and	   train	   their	   personnel	   to	   spot	   suspicious	   procurement	  
patterns.	   Identifying	   suspicious	   enquiries	   can	   improve	   the	   chance	   of	   early	   detection	   of	  
trafficking	  networks	  before	  an	  order	  is	  made	  or	  any	  goods	  are	  shipped.”76	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In	   their	   report	   “Internal	   Compliance	   Programs,”	   SIPRI	   analysts	   note	   that	   a	   central	  
element	  of	  a	  national	  export	  control	  strategy	  should	  be	  to	  ensure	  that	  entities	  that	  are	  involved	  
in	   the	   trade	   of	   controlled	   goods	   are	   both	   capable	   and	  willing	   to	   carry	   out	   their	   activities	   in	  
accordance	   with	   an	   export	   control	   environment.	   According	   to	   the	   report,	   “One	   common	  
method	  for	  achieving	  this	  goal	   involves	  companies	  putting	   into	  place	  a	  system	  that	  minimizes	  
risks	  of	  illegal	  exports.	  Such	  a	  system	  is	  generally	  referred	  to	  as	  an	  internal	  compliance	  program	  
(ICP)	  or	  an	   internal	   compliance	  systems	   (ICS).”77	  An	   ICP	  seeks	   to:	  develop	  contacts	  and	  good-­‐
standing	   relationships	   between	   the	   entity	   and	   export	   agencies;	   stay	   informed	   of	   updates	   to	  
export	  control	   rules	  and	  procedures;	   standardize	  procedures;	  provide	  a	  centralized	   forum	  for	  
export-­‐related	  questions	  and	  issues;	  provide	  early	  warning	  of	  possible	  suspicious	  enquiries	  and	  
orders;	   	   document	   all	   export	   transactions;	   and	   train	   company	   employees	   of	   the	   process	   of	  
fielding	  inquiries,	  filling	  orders,	  and	  shipping	  sensitive	  materials	  under	  established	  regulations.78	  
Governments	  can	  help	  companies	  set	  up	  an	  ICP	  that	  is	  appropriate	  for	  the	  efficient	  operation	  of	  
their	  organization.	  Also,	  governments	  can	  work	  more	  closely	  with	  business	  to	  identify	  and	  stop	  
clandestine	   procurement	   practices.	   Likewise,	   business	   managers	   need	   to	   alert	   their	  
government	   counterparts	   when	   they	   receive	   questionable	   purchase	   inquiries.	   Government	  
agencies	   can	   then	   facilitate	   interdiction	   –	   sometimes	   with	   international	   partners	   –	   to	   make	  
arrests.	  	  
CONCLUSIONS	  
In	   the	   illicit	   trafficking	   equation,	   globalization	   is	   both	   a	   significant	   part	   of	   the	  
proliferation	   problem	   and	   the	   key	   to	   the	   nonproliferation	   solution.	   Improved	   transportation	  
and	  communication	  technologies	  have	  increased	  the	  flow	  of	  materials	  and	  money	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
has	   caused	   greater	   international	   competition	   and	   greater	   interdependence	   in	   regard	   to	   their	  
economic	  health.	  Therefore,	  countries	  are	  more	  dependent	  than	  ever	  on	  each	  other	  to	  make	  
the	   right	   choices	   and	   stop	   sales	   of	   technologies	   that	   would	   ultimately	   harm	   all	   nations.	  
However,	   in	   some	   nations,	   political,	   cultural,	   and	   economic	   factors	   make	   fulfilling	   their	  
international	  nonproliferation	  obligations	  seem	  like	  mission	  impossible.	  	  
The	   illicit	   trafficking	   problem	   cannot	   be	   solved	   by	   one	   organization	   or	   one	   country	  
alone.	  It	  will	  take	  the	  intent	  of	  all	  nations	  to	  stop	  this	  activity	  and	  coordination	  among	  them	  to	  
stop	   and	   prevent	   illicit	   procurement	   networks	   from	   operating.	   Nations	   need	   to	   accept	   their	  
interdependence	   more	   fully	   and	   emphasize	   their	   efforts	   to	   strengthen	   international	  
nonproliferation	   norms.	   These	   in	   turn	   will	   improve	   national	   industrial	   capabilities.	   Better	  
implementation	   of	   international	   controls,	   better	   coordination	   among	   nations,	   greater	  
cooperation	   between	   government	   and	   business,	   and	   further	   integration	   between	   national	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export	  control	  and	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  are	  just	  a	  few	  of	  actions	  that	  nations	  can	  take	  to	  
ensure	  that	  illicit	  traffickers	  are	  identified	  and	  stopped	  from	  operating	  within	  their	  borders.79	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As grippingly retold in Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Touchstone, 
1996).  
2 Sensitive technology can be defined as any technology that may lead to the development of a weapon of mass 
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